How Decriminalisation Reduces Harm Within and Beyond Sex Work: Sex Work Abolitionism as the “Cult of Female Modesty” in Feminist Form by Bateman, Victoria
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Sexuality Research and Social Policy 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-021-00612-8
How Decriminalisation Reduces Harm Within and Beyond Sex Work: 
Sex Work Abolitionism as the “Cult of Female Modesty” in Feminist 
Form
Victoria Bateman1 
Accepted: 23 June 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Background Sex work has a long history and takes different forms, but the associated precarity and danger, particularly 
where poorer women and minorities are concerned, is undeniable. There is growing evidence that decriminalisation reduces 
harm, and, indeed, it is the policy approach favoured by sex worker groups. Despite this, many feminists instead seek to 
“end demand” for paid sex, recommending legal penalties for sex buyers, with the aim of abolishing sex work altogether.
Method This paper takes a comparative approach, examining why “end demand” is applied to sex work but not to care 
work. Abolition is typically justified both in terms of reducing harm to sex workers and to women more generally, with sex 
work’s very existence being thought to perpetuate the notion that all women are “sex objects.” Women are, however, not 
only exposed to harm within care work but are also commonly stereotyped as care givers, and in a way that has similarly 
been argued to contribute to gender inequality.
Results By comparing sex work with care work, this paper reveals the logical inconsistency in the “end demand” approach; 
unlike with sex work, there is little push to criminalise those who purchase care or other such domestic labour services. 
By revealing the moral nature of abolitionist arguments, and the disrespectful way in which sex workers are characterised 
within radical feminist literature, it argues that, rather than reducing harm, the “end demand” approach perpetuates harm, 
conspiring in the notion that “immodest” women are the cause of social ills.
Conclusions Reducing the harm that sex workers—and women more generally—face requires feminists to challenge “the 
cult of female modesty”, rather than to be complicit in it.
Keywords Sex work · Radical feminism · End demand · Nordic model · Decriminalisation · Modesty · Stigma
Introduction
When a London statue was recently unveiled to honour the 
early feminist Mary Wollstonecraft, it became a “feminist 
battleground” (Pierson-Hager, 2020). The reason was that 
emerging from a shiny abstract sculptural form was a naked 
woman, albeit a very tiny one. Despite London being in the 
midst of a global pandemic, some women went so far as to 
cover the statue’s breasts and its mass of pubic hair. The Tel-
egraph called the statue “embarrassing” (Freeman, 2020). 
Rhiannon Cosslett, writing for The Guardian, highlighted her 
“disappointment” (Cosslett, 2020). Caitlin Moran took to Twit-
ter with her critique, objecting on the basis that “being hot 
and naked so regularly defines women that to deliberately play 
into it does nothing but reinforce tired old tropes”. Dr Ailsa 
Holland announced to the Twitter world that she was “raging” 
about the statue. As Ellen Pierson-Hager neatly summarised 
the reaction in the New Statesman, “[m]any have asked why a 
statue of a thinker as pioneering as Wollstonecraft should draw 
attention to the physicality of the female body rather than to 
Wollstonecraft’s work and ideas” (Pierson-Hager, 2020; see 
also Brown, 2020).
The answer should be clear. Wollstonecraft challenged 
a society that had long believed that being female ren-
dered you intellectually inferior. Suppose we permanently 
cloaked the statue, would it do a better job of capturing 
Wollstonecraft’s argument that being born into a female 
body does not make you less capable of reason? The very 
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fact that so many “feminists” seem to think that the figure’s 
feminine nakedness fails to communicate the intellectual 
prowess of Wollstonecraft suggests that we are living in a 
society in which women are categorised as either “brains” 
or “bodies”—not, as we in fact are, both. That is some-
thing I aim to challenge every time I publicly place my own 
naked body on the line. From my nude portrait, displayed 
at the Mall Galleries in London (Bateman, 2014), to my 
naked performance at the Junction Theatre in Cambridge in 
2019, along with various naked protests, I hope to show—
whatever the theme—that behind every woman (dressed 
or undressed) is a real thinking being, and that we should 
think twice before dividing women up in dangerous and 
simplistic ways, judging them on the basis of their bodily 
modesty. But, despite it, I too am labelled “anti-feminist” 
purely on the basis that my body is not sufficiently covered, 
purely on the basis that I do not subscribe to the particu-
lar modesty requirements of our time. As Lynda Rooney 
tweeted in response to one of my naked protests: “What a 
total embarrassment ur…You’re a disgrace to all women!”. 
An anonymous gamer tweeted: “I find it troubling how 
you, as someone who has had the benefit of a high degree 
of education and presumably the mental capability to see it 
through a doctorate, honestly believe gestures like this are 
those of a sound minded and rational individual?”. Equat-
ing immodesty and stupidity clearly seems second nature. 
“Good God she single-handedly took feminism back to the 
Stone age!” tweeted Tracy Bryan. Tim Young of the Fox 
TV channel tweeted: “There’s nothing more anti-feminist 
than having to strip naked desperate for a man’s attention”. 
Many more jump in. According to Alyssa, “Being trashy 
is never classy and you certainly are quite trashy”. When 
I reply to such messages, politely and calmly, it is not 
uncommon for the senders to resort to the “block” button. 
“I’ll start listening to your discourse when you find some 
clothes. Until then, muted” says Alexandra Marshall, one 
of many.
Whether implicitly or explicitly, I am told that what I have 
to say does not deserve to be heard, all because of my lack 
of bodily modesty. I am deemed “stupid”, a “tramp” and a 
“prostitute”. Being an academic at the University of Cam-
bridge offers no defence. While judgements cast on social 
media are not always representative of the general popu-
lation, when it comes to bodily immodesty they certainly 
seem to be. Following a naked appearance on BBC Radio 
4 in February 2019, the polling organisation YouGov asked 
the British public whether naked protest is ever justifiable. 
Forty-three percent of people polled think it is unacceptable 
in all cases; a quarter of people are unsure; another quarter 
find it acceptable in some cases, and seven percent find it 
acceptable in all cases (YouGov, 2019). The national press 
capture the public sentiment. Telegraph columnist Juliet 
Samuel argued that nudity “strips my arguments of force” 
(Samuel, 2019). Theo Hobson, writing in The Spectator, 
declared it “unfeminist”. Feminism and bodily immodesty 
are, apparently, contradictory (Hobson, 2019).
In Wollstonecraft’s time, chastity and virtue were com-
monly equated when it came to women and so this kind of 
reaction to an “immodest” woman would not have been sur-
prising. Wollstonecraft, however, argued that chastity and 
virtue were two different things. In her novel “Maria: or, The 
Wrongs of Woman” (1798), we find two women transgress-
ing the social boundaries of the time but ultimately achieving 
self-knowledge, thereby encouraging the reader to consider 
what truly is virtue. But, shortly after her death, and fol-
lowing William Goodwin’s “Memoirs of the Author of the 
Rights of Women” (1798), Wollstonecraft was attacked on 
the basis of what was deemed immoral and immodest behav-
iour, branded a “whore” and “prostitute” in the press for her 
love affairs (Eberle, 2002). In their review of Goodwin’s 
book, the Anti-Jacobin Review wrote that “Mary’s theory…
is so far from being new, that it is as old as prostitution”, and 
later published a poem titled “The Vision of Liberty” that 
referred to her work as “A scripture, archly fram’d, for propa-
gating w____s” (Eberle, 2002). Ironically, the feminist critics 
of her statue seem concerned that it will have the same effect, 
and, rather than challenging this notion, have decided to sub-
scribe to it. Women must abide by the body versus brain 
categorisation, and, where they are insufficiently modest, are 
deemed not worth listening to, and certainly not “feminist”. 
Little wonder that sex workers’ voices go unheard.
While women with their bodies on show, “strutting their 
stuff”, are commonly seen as the patriarchal ideal, one 
which many feminists wish to challenge, there is an equally 
long and continuing history of the patriarchy policing and 
regulating women’s dress and sexual behaviour, one which 
also deserves to be challenged (rather than being co-opted) 
by feminism. In what is often characterised as an era of 
“raunch culture” (Barton, 2021), it might seem strange to 
be discussing what could so easily appear to be a Victorian 
value: the notion that a woman’s worth, value and respect 
hangs on her bodily modesty, a belief system which I will 
term the “cult of female modesty”. The modesty cult is 
either seen as something from a by-gone age, or as some-
thing from “distant” lands. When we are not associating 
it with Victorians, we instead associate it with countries 
such as Iran, where women removing their headscarves are 
“slut-shamed” and declared “anti-feminist” by those who 
believe that women who reveal their hair are sexualising 
and objectifying themselves, reducing their worth and repu-
tation, hurting other women and generally being destructive 
of social order. But, as we have already seen, this modesty 
cult is closer than we think. And, as we have started to see, 
rather than the patriarchy enforcing its commandments, 
shaming and demeaning women on the basis of what they 
do with their bodies, modern day women—including many 
Sexuality Research and Social Policy 
1 3
who would consider themselves feminists—are some of the 
most avid and vehement adherents. Indeed, around a half 
of “misogynistic” comments on Twitter come from women, 
with the words “slut” and “whore” dominating the language 
of abuse (Bartlett et al., 2014; Speed, 2016).
Not only are immodest women like myself instructed to 
“cover up” and declared “unfeminist”, those considered the 
most “immodest” of all—sex workers—are to be abolished. 
Gender inequality is, radical feminism teaches us, the result 
of men seeing women as “sex objects”, and, if men are to 
change their way of thinking, sex workers—apparently—
must not exist. In 2021, when Sarah Everard was kidnapped 
and murdered while walking home in London, feminist 
groups such as “Not Buying It”, turned the spotlight on strip-
pers. According to Sasha Rakoff, the existence of strip clubs 
“breeds and feeds the very attitudes that leads to harassment, 
abuse and ultimately violence against all women and girls” 
(Wall, 2021). This seems to parallel the type of response I 
have received to my own “immodest” behaviour: “Why do 
u think women are not taken seriously or listened to and 
thought as sex objects? Because of silly tarts like you…
You’re a disgrace to all women!”, wrote Lynda Rooney on 
Twitter. While not being accused of causing murder, the 
mere sight of my naked body has been accused of causing 
rape. Women themselves—from scantily clad dressers to sex 
workers—are, either implicitly or explicitly, deemed to be 
responsible for violence perpetuated by men.
The case for decriminalising sex work tends to be made 
in terms of reducing harm to sex workers themselves (Platt 
et al., 2018). However, feminist resistance to decriminalisa-
tion cannot be tackled unless we also confront the claim that 
sex work is bad for all women: that sex work causes harm 
beyond sex workers themselves. In what follows, we will 
turn initially to history, with a particular focus on the UK, 
to see the way in which sex work has long been seen as a 
“problem” not only at the level of sex workers themselves 
but also at the broader level of society. We will then look 
in more detail at how radical feminism makes its own claim 
in regard to the latter: that sex work imposes a cost on all 
women in society by turning them into “sex objects” in the 
minds of men. This position will be critiqued by drawing 
on a comparison with care work. Just as women have com-
monly been thought of as “sex objects” they have also been 
characterised as the “care givers” in society, constraining 
their ability to achieve equality in the public sphere. How-
ever, while feminists use the argument that sex work encour-
ages dangerous gendered stereotyping and, as such, it should 
be abolished, the equivalent argument is is not made in the 
case of care work. By highlighting the moralism that lies 
behind this logical inconsistency, we will see how the femi-
nist objection to sex work plays into the hands of the “cult 
of female modesty”, de-valuing sex workers’ contribution, 
rendering worthless their voices, and dis-respecting their 
existence. This parallels the wider demonisation of “immod-
est” women, as I have myself seen by putting my own body 
on the line.
Contrary to radical feminism, I will argue that it is soci-
ety’s division of women into “good girls” and “whores”, 
where “whores” are deemed as undeserving of respect, 
which can often be found at the root of society-wide mis-
treatment of women. The radical feminist ambition—which 
seeks to abolish sex work—conspires in such thinking, fuel-
ling “whore” stigma by suggesting that sex work is wrong, 
that no woman in her “right mind” would choose to do it 
(hence all sex workers can be cast as “victims”), and that 
sex workers are the (albeit unwilling) cause of the sins men 
inflict on other women. Rather than challenging the “cult of 
female modesty”, feminists conspire in its teaching.
Rather than reducing harm, sex work abolitionism 
increases harm, not just for individual sex workers but for 
all women. Instead of ending demand for sex work, it’s time 
to end demand for “end demand”. Just as abolishing head-
scarves is not the correct means to tackle the “cult of female 
modesty”, abolishing sex workers is not the correct means to 
tackle the notion that women are all “sex objects”.
Sex Work Abolitionism: Then and Now
In the Christian tradition, women’s bodies have long been 
represented as the fundamental source of temptation, and a 
central source of sin, not helped by an infamous story involv-
ing a serpent, an apple and the Garden of Eden. As Ruth 
Mazo Karras explains, “[w]omen were lustful and therefore 
dangerous to men. All the other criticisms of women ulti-
mately came down to the sexual threat that they presented” 
(Karras, 1996, p. 107). While chastity was preached as the 
ideal for everyone, women were not only seen as the ulti-
mate source of temptation, they were also held to a different 
standard: “Having had sex did not make a man permanently 
impure, because men in heterosexual intercourses were not 
penetrated” (Karras, 2017, pp. 45–6).
So as to preserve the virtue of the “mass” of women, the 
Church not only supported but owned and made money from 
brothels, albeit regulating where and on what days of the 
year sex workers could practice their trade. The Bishop of 
Winchester’s brothel in Southwark was the most notorious 
in London in the late middle ages: “The authorities judged it 
better to abandon a small group of women to sin and corrup-
tion in order to serve these men than to subject the whole of 
society to the disorder that would otherwise ensue” (Karras, 
1996, p. 76). However, the difficult relationship between reli-
gious authorities and sex work resulted in a rather unstable 
set of regulations and policies.
By the end of the medieval era, sexual desire was seen 
both as a threat to individual salvation and “destructive of 
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social order” (Karras, 1996, p. 103). During the Reforma-
tion, Christians competed to prove their “purity” (Berkowitz, 
2012, p. 191). According to Luther, sex workers were “scabby, 
scratching stinking” beings who should be “broken on the 
wheel and flayed” (Berkowitz, 2012, p. 192). Brothels across 
Europe were closed down (Berkowitz, 2012, p. 193).
This attack on sexual immorality was not confined to sex 
workers. The “cult of female modesty” affected the life of 
every woman, with unmarried women particularly on the 
radar. In sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, as docu-
mented by the historian Merry Wiesner-Hanks (2015), the 
bodies of unmarried women were increasingly under sur-
veillance by the authorities, which included, for example, 
the breasts of unmarried women being examined for signs 
of childbirth when abandoned babies were found (Wiesner-
Hanks, 2015, p. 68). In 1556, the French parliament ordered 
that all pregnancies be notified to the authorities and that, if 
they were not and the resultant baby died, the mother would 
be subject to the death penalty, on the assumption that it was 
infanticide (Wiesner-Hanks, 2015, p. 67). One eighteenth 
century German medic suggested that all unmarried women 
should be observed monthly in a public bath for signs of 
pregnancy (Wiesner-Hanks, 2015, p. 68). Any woman who 
lay on the margins of society was at particular risk through-
out this wide-ranging attack on women’s “sinful” bodies. 
Women’s bodies had long been associated with witchcraft, 
in possession of powers that men could not control, and now 
they were being hunted out and murdered in their thousands 
(Carr-Gomm, 2012, pp. 30–1).
Soon, the very same printing presses that distributed the 
religious material that stoked the Reformation were find-
ing other purposes, including literary ones. The story of the 
“harlot’s progress”, from innocence to experience and then 
an untimely death, would have been familiar to any eight-
eenth century reader of novels (Eberle, 2002). Fear of being 
branded a “whore” haunted the life of every woman.
Against this backdrop, the feminists of the nineteenth 
century could not avoid thinking about sex work. Not only 
did they think about it, they were divided by it (Jolin, 1994). 
However, the UK’s 1860s Contagious Diseases Acts, which 
spread across the world as a consequence of colonisation 
(Levine, 2003), served to unite many women in opposition 
to the state’s regulation of sex workers. These Acts allowed 
authorities to forcibly remove and intimately examine any 
woman suspected of prostitution, something which caused 
particular reflection among feminists. A repeal lobby 
formed, highlighting the sexual double-standards of the law, 
demanding a re-thinking of “prostitution” law in general. 
With feminists to a degree united, this meant that the voices 
campaigning for the further criminalisation of sex work in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century “were largely 
not feminists” but were instead: “a conservative, male-led, 
moral reform movement, that believed it was indeed possible 
to ‘make men moral by an Act of Parliament’. These moral 
reform campaigners wished to see prostitution totally crimi-
nalized, and all migration for those identified as prostitutes 
(and pimps) banned” (Laite, 2020). The law increasingly 
targeted those involved in sex work beyond the sex work-
ers themselves, including brothel-keeping (Laite, 2006). By 
1912, UK law was punishing anyone convicted of “control-
ling or directing the movements of a prostitute”, not just the 
“prostitutes” themselves (McCarthy et al., 2015).
In 1928, the UK’s Macmillan Report—the Report of the 
Street Offences Committee—was published. It was a Com-
mittee formed in part following the much talked about argu-
ments of the aptly named abolitionist group, The Association 
for Moral and Social Hygiene. As Samantha Caslin writes, 
“[c]oncerns about how the prostitute should be defined in 
relation to other women, the influence of her presence over 
other women and her supposed impact upon public morals 
were key features in 1920s debates” and the Chair of the 
Committee, High Macmillan “tried to rationalise solicitation 
as both a legal and moral issue by suggesting that prostitu-
tion represented a threat to the moral and therefore national 
order; it was tantamount to an offence against social sta-
bility” (Caslin in McCarthy et al., 2015). Women’s wider 
appearance in public life left many increasingly concerned 
about prostitution:
“By the 1920s, the moral anxiety provoked by pros-
titutes was closely associated with concerns over 
women’s symbolic move from the domestic sphere 
and their greater presence in public places such as 
shopping malls and entertainment venues. It was no 
longer easy to say that a woman walking through the 
streets wearing make-up was likely to be a prostitute. 
Additionally, fears about greater sexual freedom meant 
that the law’s definition of a ‘common prostitute’ was 
becoming problematic. Questions were asked about 
whether girls who had sex on dates in exchange for 
non-monetary payments such as gifts were in fact 
engaging in a form of ‘amateur’ prostitution and, if 
so, what did this mean for the regulation of the ‘profes-
sional prostitute’?” (Caslin in McCarthy et al., 2015).
As in early modern Europe, the demonisation of sex work 
fed through to raise questions about women more generally. 
“Whore-phobia” came with a distrust of women’s activities 
more generally; every woman was at risk of being consid-
ered a “whore”.
In 1957, the Wolfenden Report followed. The blurred 
lines between what was called the “common prostitute” and 
women more generally were also apparent here and so too 
was concern about “whether prostitutes encouraged ‘nor-
mal’ women to engage in immoral behaviours” (McCarthy 
et al., 2015). This report aimed to move away from moral 
discourse, but found it could not. The Report judged that 
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“prostitution” was “an evil of which any society which 
claims to be civilised should seek to rid itself”. However, it 
recommended that only visible “prostitution” be punished 
by the law, as that involved immorality on display to the 
general public, with greater social consequences. Given 
the continued debate on what exactly a “prostitute” was, 
and whether a young woman engaging in sex with someone 
who had paid for her dinner constituted one, this distinction 
between visible solicitation and private behaviour provided 
an apparent resolution.
With the radical feminist movement of the 1970s, the 
impact of sex work on wider society remained central. Rad-
ical feminists were concerned specifically with the social 
impact on womankind, and held the sex buyer—as opposed 
to sex seller—as at fault, echoing nineteenth century femi-
nist depictions of the “prostitute” herself as a victim (Laite, 
2006; Scoular, 2004, p. 349). But, the policy approach that 
has since developed has as much in common with the Victo-
rian moralists as it does with the feminists critics of the Con-
tagious Diseases Acts. “End demand” has been spreading 
across the Western world. Its aim is to strangle the demand 
for sex, with the ultimate goal of eliminating sex work. The 
approach was, in recent times, first introduced in Scandi-
navia, becoming known as the “Nordic Model”, spreading 
from Sweden to Norway (2009), Iceland (2009), Canada 
(2014), France (2016), Ireland (2017) and Israel (2018). 
Northern Ireland adopted the Nordic Model in 2015, while 
elsewhere in the UK, it has received the backing of both the 
Women’s Equality Party and the Fawcett Society, and has 
the approval of the Chair of the All Party Parliamentary 
Group on Prostitution, Sarah Champion MP. Indeed, the All 
Party Group’s “Shifting the Burden” Report (2014) recom-
mended this particular approach. In December 2020 Labour 
MP Dame Diana Johnson put forward an associated Private 
Members’ Bill to the UK parliament. It claims to be “radical 
in spirit and feminist in practice, and that it will help prevent 
trafficking, pimping, and abuse” (Laite, 2020). The Euro-
pean Parliament had already passed a motion encouraging 
member countries to adopt this kind of approach, and so the 
UK is now riding a popular wave.
Despite the popularity of this new policy approach, 
Amnesty International, the World Health Organisation and 
the Royal College of Nursing have all expressed concerns, 
with growing evidence suggesting that criminalising the 
purchaser of sex, even when the seller of sex is not them-
selves criminalised, pushes sex workers into greater danger. 
After Ireland implemented the Nordic model in 2017, vio-
lent attacks on sex workers increased by 50% (Casey, 2018). 
More generally, a recent overview of the numerous quanti-
tative studies published between 1990 and 2018—covering 
a range of countries—found that sex workers are twice as 
likely to have an STD and three times more likely to be vic-
tims of violence under criminalisation (Platt et al., 2018). A 
synthesis of the qualitative evidence provided by more than 
ninety publications over the same time period suggests that 
this is because “in contexts of criminalisation, the threat and 
enactment of police harassment and arrest of sex workers or 
their clients displaced sex workers into isolated work loca-
tions, disrupting peer support networks and service access, 
and limiting risk reduction opportunities. It discouraged sex 
workers from carrying condoms and exacerbated existing 
inequalities experienced by transgender, migrant, and drug-
using sex workers” (Platt et al., 2018, pp. 1–2). To quote 
one sex worker:
“They couldn’t have designed a law better to make it 
less safe, even if they sat for years! It’s like you have 
to hide out, you can’t talk to a guy, and there’s no dis-
cussion about what you’re willing to do and for how 
much. The negotiation has to take place afterwards, 
which is always so much scarier…it’s designed to set 
it up to be dangerous. I don’t think it was the origi-
nal intention, but that’s what it does” (Canadian sex 
worker, quoted in Platt et al., 2018, p. 39).
While the feminists championing “end demand” claim 
that it will help those forced into sex work, as Julia Laite 
(2006) explains, past history is not in their favour:
“Several laws were passed between 1885 and 1922 to 
curb the exploitation of women and children in prosti-
tution. However, while public concern and sentiment 
most often worried over the third-party role in prostitu-
tion, it always seemed to be the prostitutes themselves 
who felt the overwhelming brunt of the law’s force. 
For instance, though 1898 saw a new Amendment to 
the Vagrancy Act passed, which made ’living off the 
earnings of a prostitute’ (or pimping) an offence, in 
1900 only 165 ’pimps’ were sentenced while 7,415 
women were convicted under the solicitation laws”
Against this historical context, and armed with their own 
experiences and evidence, it is therefore not surprising that 
sex workers and sex work organisations demand a very dif-
ferent type of policy approach to that of “end demand”: 
for their work to be decriminalised, as was pioneered by 
New Zealand in 2003. Paralleling the broader human rights 
movement, the sex worker movement gathered force in the 
1970s, bringing individual sex workers together from across 
the globe to campaign for rights and respect. This culmi-
nated in 1985, in the first World Whores’ Congress, when a 
World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights was published, mak-
ing a call to decriminalise sex work and, importantly, “to 
change social attitudes which stigmatize and discriminate 
against prostitutes and ex-prostitutes of any race, gender or 
nationality” (see Weiss, 2018, p. 304). This was followed by 
the publication of “A Vindication of the Rights of Whores” 
(Pheterson, 1989), carrying with it an insistence that Mary 
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Wollstonecraft’s teachings are as applicable to sex workers 
as they are to all women.
Our brief overview of history reveals the way in which 
sex work has long been seen as a “problem” that is in need of 
a solution; a “problem” at the level of individual sex workers 
(who have been cast as everything from immoral beings to 
victims) and a “problem” at the level of society (destabilis-
ing society either by “tempting” men or by rendering women 
“sex objects”). Policy responses have varied, and still do 
today. What is, however, increasingly clear is the dispar-
ity between feminist demands to abolish sex work and sex 
workers’ own demands for rights and respect. In the UK, 
feminists organisations such as the Fawcett Society and the 
Women’s Equality Party therefore stand in marked opposi-
tion to sex worker organisations and activist groups, which 
include Decrim Now, SWARM and the English Collective 
of Prostitutes.
So why—despite the protestations of sex workers—do 
feminist groups persist with the “end demand” approach? As 
we will see in the section which follows, the justification that 
radical feminists and abolitionists provide does not simply 
revolve around a claim about sex workers, but also a claim 
about women more generally. Even if radical feminists could 
be convinced that decriminalisation does more to reduce 
the harm faced by sex workers than does “end demand”, 
that would not be enough to end the feminist resistance to 
decriminalisation. That is because, for abolitionists, more is 
at stake than individual sex workers: the fate of all women.
Sex Workers Versus the Sisterhood
Susan Brownmiller’s “Against Our Will”, published in 
1979, “changed the way we talk about rape” (Cohen, 
2015). According to The New York Times’ Book Review, 
it “deserves a place on the shelf next to those rare books 
about social problems which force us to make connections 
we have too long evaded, and change the way we feel about 
what we know” (Gale, 1975). It went on to become one of 
New York Public Library’s “Books of the Century”. At the 
time it was published, rape was seen as a “deviant” crime, 
but Brownmiller had become increasingly aware of just how 
many women’s lives it affected. She was part of a feminist 
consciousness raising group known as the New York Radical 
Feminists, which involved women meeting together to share 
and talk about their experiences. The group built a shared 
recognition of oppression, and created a push to tackle prob-
lems at a systematic—as opposed to individual—level. Not 
only did the numerous experiences of rape become appar-
ent, but also the unhelpful response of legal authorities, 
which included: “who’d want to rape you?”, “too calm to 
be credible”, and “you were asking for it” (Cooke, 2018). 
Brownmiller argued that rape is not so much about lust but 
is instead about power: “a conscious process of intimida-
tion by which all men keep all women in a state of fear” 
(Brownmiller, 2013 [1979], p. 34). Rather than seeing it as 
an outcome of biology, she argued it was a practice of male 
domination. This male domination is what Radical Femi-
nism identifies as being the source of a set of shared prob-
lems which women face.
According to the 1969 New York Redstocking Manifesto:
“Women are an oppressed class…We are considered 
inferior beings whose only purpose is to enhance 
men’s lives…we have been kept from seeing our per-
sonal suffering as a political condition…the conflicts 
between individual men and women are political con-
flicts that can only be solved collectively…We identify 
the agents of our oppression as men. Male supremacy 
is the oldest most basic form of domination” (Bryson, 
2016, p. 157).
By the 1970s, and in an attempt to prove the point, the 
group “Women Against Pornography” were conducting 
tours of New York’s “seedy” underbelly in and around 
Times Square, including its famous strip clubs, “pleasure 
palaces” and pornographic bookstores. The group charged 
five dollars per person for their tours, taking more than two 
and a half thousand people on their excursions, including 
nuns (Cooke, 2018). Sometimes they watched in silence as 
women paraded in front of men; at other times, they pro-
tested. Either way, they certainly did not accept the view 
that the “sexual revolution” of the 1960s was liberating 
women—to them, it was an extension of male oppression. 
The activities of “Women Against Pornography” live on 
today in the form of, for example, in the UK, the feminist 
group “Object!”, armed with their popular phrase “we object 
to objectification”.
Catherine MacKinnon argues that both pornography 
and “prostitution” (the two P’s) perpetuate the domination 
of women by men; that not only are they the product of a 
patriarchal system, but a driving force within that system, 
reinforcing the idea that women exist to meet the sexual 
desires of men, that a woman’s own sexual satisfaction does 
not matter, and that a woman’s role is to submit to men’s 
sexual demands. She and other radical feminists argue that 
the two P’s cause harm not only to the women involved but 
to womankind more generally; contributing to men view-
ing women as sexual play-things, and, in doing so, feeding 
through to the rape and mistreatment of all women. Accord-
ing to MacKinnon (1993), pornography “deprives women of 
the right to express verbal refusal of an intercourse”:
“Pornography…is a form of forced sex, a practice of 
sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality. In 
this perspective, pornography, with the rape and pros-
titution in which it participates, institutionalises the 
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sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotici-
sation of dominance and submission with the social 
construction of male and female. Gender is sexual. 
Pornography constitutes the meaning of that sexuality. 
Men treat women as whom they see women as being. 
Pornography constructs who that is. Men’s power over 
women means that the way men see women defines 
who women can be” (MacKinnon, 1989, p. 197).
In other words, pornography is used “to train women to 
sexual submission” (MacKinnon, 1987, p. 188). Sex work 
itself is seen as “paid rape” (see e.g. Cawston, 2019; Bindel, 
2020). According to Andrea Dworkin “[p]rostitution in and 
of itself is an abuse of a woman’s body” and exists as a 
reflection of male supremacy:
“Male dominance means that the society creates a 
pool of prostitutes by any means necessary so that 
men have what men need to stay on top, to feel big, 
literally, metaphorically, in every way…Every man 
in this society benefits from the fact that women are 
prostituted whether or not every man uses a woman 
in prostitution…prostitution comes from male domi-
nance” (Dworkin, 1993, pp. 9–10).
Armed with these ideas, the European Women’s Lobby’s 
“Abolitionist Principles” include the statement that “[t]he 
prostitution of women and girls constitutes a fundamental 
violation of women’s human rights and a serious form of 
male violence against women” (European Women’s Lobby, 
2011). Similarly, the Nordic Model Now! group, which cam-
paigns for “end demand” policies, argues that “the system of 
prostitution perpetuates the archaic practice of female sexual 
submission for male entertainment” (Nordic Model Now!, 
2016, p. 8) that “feeds the punter’s sense of entitlement and 
the sense that she has no rights” (Nordic Model Now!, 2016, 
p. 11).
Just as Marxism does not believe that exploitation can 
be resolved without tackling class, radical feminism does 
not believe that the exploitation of women can be resolved 
without confronting sex: “Sexuality is considered as the 
primary dynamic in the ordering of society” and “prostitu-
tion” is seen as playing an important role in “maintaining the 
dynamic” (Scoular, 2004, p. 345). The two P’s are thought to 
instil the idea that men dominate and women acquiesce, and 
in a way that is glamorised and eroticised. As far as policy is 
concerned, radical feminism believes that it is hypocritical 
to, on the one hand, be pursuing an agenda of gender equal-
ity while, on the other, pursuing policies that decriminalise 
rather than clamp down on sex work. The ultimate goal is 
the complete elimination of sex work.
In sum, the feminist vein of sex work abolitionism 
focusses not only on what it sees as the exploitation of the 
individual sex worker, but also on the wider consequences of 
sex work for the perpetuation of a system—patriarchy—that 
it holds responsible for the harms inflicted on womankind 
more generally (Bateman, 2019). Radical feminism per-
ceives of all sex work as rape and exploitation: society makes 
a “false distinction between forced and voluntary prostitu-
tion” (Jeffries, 1997, p. 10; Nordic Model Now!, 2016, p .4). 
But, as Berg (2020) highlights, in the framework of radical 
feminism, the “problem” with sex work is less about “dam-
age” to sex workers’ own well-being “but rather what hap-
pens when men impose this same treatment on respectable 
women outside the home and the brothel…The sex worker 
is not a person with her own claims for respectful, negoti-
ated working conditions, but rather a metaphor to dramatise 
the harms” that other women face (Berg, 2020, p. 273). So, 
can a case be made that sex work is harmful to other women 
on the basis of which it should be abolished? A comparison 
with other forms of work can offer us some insight.
What About the Cleaning? And Who Cares?
What is really at the root of gender inequality? This is the ques-
tion that must necessarily be asked when we seek to identify how 
we can best tackle it. Without knowing the correct cause, our 
policy solutions will be mis-targeted, potentially making things 
worse rather than better. As we have seen, according to radical 
feminism, the two P’s—pornography and “prostitution”—feed 
men’s sexual desires and feelings of superiority, generating lack 
of respect for—and mistreatment of—women in general. But, 
in addition to being considered “sex objects”, women are also 
commonly assumed to be the default caregivers within society. 
Feminist economics identifies gendered assumptions about care 
as being central to gender inequality. So, if sex work is consid-
ered harmful for womankind by—supposedly—nurturing the 
belief that women are “sex objects”, why does radical feminism 
not argue similarly in regard to society’s even bigger army of 
female carers and cleaners? The parallel between sex work and 
care work raises a number of questions. Since unpaid care is 
commonly seen as responsible for “branding” women as the 
carers of society, why do sex work abolitionists focus on paid-
for sex as being key to women being branded “sex objects”? 
Do abolitionists and radical feminists think that all care work 
should be for free, just as they think that all sex should be for 
free, in order to prevent women from being rendered some form 
of object for men’s caring—as well as sexual—needs? And why 
is it that when we turn to the extensive feminist literature on 
the topic of care, we find no demand to “end demand” for care 
work’s paid-for variety, and, instead, a movement to seek proper 
payment for its unpaid variety, along with better pay and condi-
tions for paid care workers? Comparing sex work and care work 
is a useful way of teasing out the logic—or otherwise—of the 
“end demand” approach to sex work.
In 1975, an international campaign known as “Wages 
for Housework” served a notice to all governments: “We 
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clean your homes and factories. We raise the next genera-
tion of workers for you. Whatever else we may do, we are 
the housewives of the world.... We are serving notice to 
you that we intend to be paid for the work we do” (New 
York Wages for Housework Committee, 1975; Federici, 
1975; Toupin, 2018). Since that time, an expanding litera-
ture within feminist economics has identified care as the 
central source of gender inequality (see e.g. Federici, 2012; 
Folbre, 2002). More recent empirical work finds that the 
unequal division of labour within the home contributes in 
important ways to the gender pay gap (International Labour 
Organisation, 2018; ONS, 2016). According to the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (2018), the amount of unpaid 
care conducted globally is the equivalent of two billion peo-
ple working full-time for nothing, and three-quarters of this 
unpaid care is carried out by women. The fact that care is 
considered a female responsibility affects the educational 
and work opportunities of women and girls, their ability to 
progress in the workplace, and their overall degree of finan-
cial independence. Not only are highly gendered expecta-
tions in terms of who conducts unpaid care central to the 
gap in earnings between men and women, so too is the way 
in which even paid care or domestic work is poorly remu-
nerated, in part because of its characterisation as “women’s 
work”. In the UK, it is estimated that almost a half of care 
workers earn below “the living wage”, which is more than 
double the proportion for the economy as a whole (Dromey 
& Hochlaf, 2018).
Black feminism reveals an even deeper history of engage-
ment with the “problem” of care (Berg, 2020). Here, exploi-
tation has long been identified in the domain of domestic 
service, which comes in the form of zero or miserable 
pay, together with physical abuse and sexual exploitation. 
LaShawn Harris (2016) argues that, in the case of the USA, 
some domestic workers moved into sex work in preference 
to working in white homes. In fact, not only is there a his-
tory of physical and sexual abuse within domestic work, 
it is one that continues today (Berg, 2020; Harris, 1990). 
Moreover, while much of the discussion of international traf-
ficking tends to focus on sex work, domestic slavery is also a 
significant part of the trafficking world. Global estimates of 
modern slavery suggest that 40 million people are victims of 
slavery, 25 million of which are in forced labour and 15 mil-
lion of which are in forced marriage (International Labour 
Organisation, 2017). This means that there are more than 
five victims for every thousand people in the world. Of the 
25 million in forced labour, 4.8 million are estimated to be 
in forced sexual exploitation and 16 million in other forms of 
private sector labour exploitation, including domestic work, 
agriculture and construction (International Labour Organisa-
tion, 2017).
However, when it comes to care work and domestic 
service, the solution offered to an extensive range of what 
could be termed exploitation (from forced labour to lowly 
paid labour) is one of rights, recognition and unionisation. 
Premilla Nadasen (2015) presents the story of household 
workers of the world uniting. In Brazil, domestic work-
ers formed a union, secured legal reforms and success-
fully lobbied for an ILO Convention on Domestic Work-
ers (Blofield and Jokela, 2018). The gendered and highly 
damaging societal expectation that women are care giv-
ers is certainly not being tackled by a policy package of 
abolishing paid care workers (by criminalising those who 
employ carers or cleaners), or by aiming for a world in 
which all care and domestic labour is conducted for free. 
Similarly, the care a parent or guardian offers their child is 
not commonly thought to have been “diminished” by the 
availability of childcare, and in order that we can value 
those who cook a home-cooked meal, we have not sought 
to abolish take-away.
So, given their underlying similarities, why does radi-
cal feminism want to “end demand” for sex work in order 
to tackle gendered stereotypes, but does not argue for an 
equivalent approach when it comes to domestic and caring 
services?
First is the abolitionist claim that all sex workers—
whether or not they claim to be voluntary—are victims, 
forced to cater to male sexual desire. In 2005, the Coali-
tion Against Trafficking in Women published a Survivors 
of Prostitution and Trafficking Manifesto. This contests “the 
idea that prostitution is simply an individual choice, or asso-
ciated with sexual freedom, or glamorous, or a way out of 
poverty, or inevitable; on the contrary, it is a form of women’s 
inequality marked by exploitation and oppression” (Weiss, 
2018, p.  439). But, as a member of the English Collective 
of Prostitutes once remarked: “The sex industry is not the 
only industry which is male-dominated and degrades women, 
but it is the industry where the workers are illegal and can 
least defend publicly our right to our job” (Nina Lopez-Jones, 
quoted in Zatz, 1997, p. 291). As we have already noted, 
domestic service is also a sector involving abuse and exploi-
tation, and low (or no) pay is a constant feature of care work. 
So how do radical feminists differentiate sex work from other 
forms of potentially exploitative labour in a way that allows 
them to single it out for separate—abolitionist—treatment? 
According to Noah D. Zatz, “[n]one do this very well, but 
those who try tend to fall back on the same kind of nor-
malising discourse…sex should be private and intimate, not 
commodified and part of public life” (Zatz, 1997, p. 288). 
In the words of Monica O’Connor, “sexual consent is not a 
commodity that…should be bought” (O’Connor, 2019, p. 3) 
and “certain aspects of human life are corrupted and demised 
if bought and sold in the market” (O’Connor, 2019, p. 108).
Zatz relates this way of thinking to a longer history, and 
what is in fact a central theme in the broader feminist litera-
ture, the division between public and private spheres: “in 
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hegemonic Euro-American culture, sexuality and money are 
thought of as things that cannot, do not, and/or should not 
mix. This separation is related at least in part to the attribu-
tion of money, commerce, and contract to the public realm of 
work and intimacy, desire, and pleasure to the private realm 
of familial and other affective relationships” (Zatz, 1997, p. 
294). Sex work challenges this, and the “criminalization [of 
sex work] helps patrol the boundary between the sex/affec-
tive labor routinely assigned to and expected of women and 
practices deserving of the financial and status rewards of 
“work”” (Zatz, 1997, p. 287).
Writing from a liberal perspective, Martha Nussbaum 
(1999) also notes the way in which sex work crosses this cul-
tural wall. Two centuries ago, so did receiving payment for 
a whole range of tasks, including acting, singing and poetry. 
She identifies two contributing factors to this disapproval 
of the exchange of a service for money: “aristocratic class 
prejudice and fear of the body and its passions” (Nussbaum, 
1999, pp. 278–279). Accepting money “dirtied” and made 
less “pure” the service, while display of the body and its pas-
sions in a monetary sense was considered vulgar. However, 
while it is now deemed respectable to accept money in return 
for acting, singing, and poetry, that is still not the case with 
sex work. To understand why, Nussbaum compares sex work 
with six other jobs in which women “take money for bodily 
services”: plucking chickens, domestic service, a nightclub 
singer who takes requests, a philosopher, a skilled masseuse 
and a hypothetical “colonoscopy artist”, the last of which 
would involve using your own colon as a testing ground for 
the latest medical developments (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 281). 
Perhaps the closest to sex work in terms of intimate bod-
ily intrusion would be the colonoscopy artist, but few of us 
would see it as “bad”. Nussbaum concludes that, when it 
comes to sex work, “the biggest difference consists in the fact 
that it is, today, more widely stigmatized”, and that this boils 
down to questions of what is and is not “moral” (Nussbaum, 
1999, p. 288). Abolitionism does nothing to challenge what 
Jane Scoular sums up as the “culturally specific processes 
that separate work from relationships of intimacy” and “the 
whore stigma, which…reflects deeply felt anxieties about 
women trespassing the dangerous boundaries between private 
and public” (Scoular, 2004, p. 346). If anything, it co-opts it.
None of this is to suggest that sex work is always the oppo-
site of what radical feminism claims: subversive rather than 
culturally conformist, and liberating rather than exploitative. 
There are a wide variety of experiences and meanings for 
those involved in sex work. We must avoid “viewing pros-
titution as either inherently oppressive or as an expression 
of sexual freedom” (Scoular, 2004, p. 349). A sex worker’s 
financial situation, the legal system they face, and the cultural 
baggage—the degree of social stigma—that comes with it will 
affect that experience and meaning (Zatz, 1997). These things, 
however, are all made worse—not better—by criminalisation.
Indeed, according to Marxist feminists, radical feminists focus 
too much on sex and not enough on poverty. Zatz turns to Marx, 
for whom “[p]rostitution is only a specific expression of the gen-
eral prostitution of the labourer” (Zatz, 1997, pp. 287–288). Sex 
work certainly can be forced, coerced or involve little choice, 
but at the root of that is poverty, which is better addressed by 
the same kind of policy approach being pioneered in regard to 
domestic labour and care (Berg, 2020; Zatz, 1997). Interestingly, 
like Marxist feminists, liberal-leaning Martha Nussbaum seems 
to agree, arguing that “[radical] feminist theory may be insuf-
ficiently grounded in the reality of working-class lives and too 
focused on sexuality as an issue in its own right, as if it could be 
extricated from the fabric of poor people’s attempts to survive” 
(Nussbaum, 1999, p. 278). Being a liberal thinker, for Nussbaum 
individual choice is key, and so when sex work becomes con-
cerning is where the economic situation restricts choice: “This 
seems to me the truly important issue raised by prostitution” 
she concludes (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 296). Legal intervention to 
“end-demand” for paid sex does nothing to address the economic 
inequalities that lead many into sex work. As Nussbaum (1999) 
therefore argues, “the important thing to realize is that this is not 
an issue that permits us to focus on prostitution in isolation from 
the economic situation of women in a society generally. Certainly 
it will not be ameliorated by the criminalization of prostitution, 
which reduces poor women’s options still further. We may grant 
that poor women do not have enough options, and that society has 
been unjust to them in not extending more options while nonethe-
less respecting and honoring the choices they actually make in 
reduced circumstances” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 296). Not only does 
“end demand” not address underlying economic issues, it makes 
the situation worse, closing down and making more risky earning 
income from sex, and by making it more difficult for sex workers 
to collectivise (Zatz, 1997). Whereas radical feminists turn to the 
state for a solution, Marxist feminism, liberal feminism and Black 
feminism is much more sceptical. According to Alison Phipps 
(2020), the belief that the state can offer a solution—as opposed 
to making oppression worse— is associated with whiteness and 
other forms of privilege (Phipps, 2020, pp. 46–49).
So, what else might help explain why radical feminists 
and other “end demand” supporters are so intent on abolish-
ing sex work but not care work, despite both contributing 
to the gendered stereotypes that it sees as responsible for 
gender inequality? It is, of course, notable that the army of 
sex workers is significantly smaller than the army of care 
workers and cleaners. It has been estimated that there are 
around 72,800 sex workers in the UK, the vast majority of 
whom are female (Brooks-Gordon et al., 2015). By contrast, 
there are more than 1.6 million people in the UK working 
in social care alone; 74% of these are directly providing 
care (Skills for Care, 2011, 2020). As with sex work, the 
vast majority are female: more than eighty percent of adult 
social care jobs are held by women (Skills for Care, 2020). 
If radical feminists were to apply the same “end demand” 
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approach to care, that would leave many people—on both 
the buying and selling sides of these exchanges—up in arms. 
Would you be happy to be rendered a criminal for plac-
ing your elderly parent in a care home, or for purchasing at 
home care or cleaning services? If a government adopted the 
“end demand” approach, what would happen to the votes of 
those millions of care workers and care buyers? In contrast 
to care workers, sex workers are in a clear minority within 
the workforce and, as such, radical feminists find it much 
easier to campaign for policies that “end demand” for their 
services. Furthermore, whilst as a society it is not necessar-
ily deemed shameful to buy cleaning and caring services, 
many would be ashamed for other people to know that they 
purchased sex. One study of 110 Scottish men who have 
bought sex found, when asked, that 86% would be deterred 
by having their picture on a billboard and 84% having their 
picture in a local newspaper (Macleod et al., 2008, p. 27). 
Hence, we cannot expect a “buyer” lobby to emerge that 
supports sex workers; if it did, and based on what research 
is available on the clients of sex workers, it could well run 
into the millions. By contrast, when it comes to care work 
and domestic service, women themselves are big buyers. 
Berg has her own answer for why feminists are happy to sup-
port “end-demand” in sex work but not in the whole range 
of what might be termed domestic service tasks “because 
white women have always been bosses in this realm” (Berg, 
2020, p. 269); it would be like turkeys voting for Christmas.
A further difference is that unlike care, sex is considered 
unnecessary. Abolitionist literature is clear that the idea that 
people have “sexual needs” that need to be fulfilled is a poor 
argument for maintaining sex work (Banyard, 2016). Con-
versely, often we cannot exist unless someone takes on jobs 
involving caring. Indeed, Susan Himmelweit defines care 
as “the provision of personal services to meet those basic 
physical and mental needs that allow a person to function at 
a socially determined acceptable level of capability, comfort 
and safety” (Himmelweit, 2007, p. 581). Dependency is a 
natural state of human existence: at some point we all need 
help from others. Hence, “ending demand” for carers would 
create a clear problem, impacting millions.
But the claim that sex work is unnecessary (unlike care) 
is not enough to justify abolition. After all, even if some-
thing is not necessary, it does not mean that it is not valu-
able; sex creates pleasure, and that’s worth something to 
the person receiving the stimulation and orgasm. If some-
one freely chooses to meet the associated demand, what is 
the problem? This therefore brings us to another difference 
between sex work and cleaning and caring that could serve 
to “justify” the abolition of the former but not the latter. 
The more one believes that sex—and certainly paid sex—is 
a “problem”, the more one can reconcile ending demand for 
sex work with not doing the same in regard to cleaning and 
care work, both of which, like sex work, could be argued to 
be nurturing stereotypes that contribute to gender inequality. 
According to radical feminist Carole Pateman, sex work is 
“morally undesirable” (Pateman, 1983, p. 56). Shifting the 
Burden (2014), the UK Report which recommended chang-
ing the law to shift the burden of criminality onto sex buy-
ers as opposed to sex sellers (the “end demand” approach), 
notes that “[l]egislation on prostitution is not value-free” 
and that it “sends a signal about what is, and what is not, 
acceptable” (All-Party Parliamentary Group on Prostitution 
and the Global Sex Trade, 2014, p. 47). Radical feminists 
along with other supporters of sex work abolition and “end 
demand” wish to send the signal that the exchange of sex for 
money is not acceptable.
Unlike sex work, cleaning and caring are not commonly 
considered “immoral” at the individual level, at either the 
selling or buying end of the trade. Cleanliness is, of course, 
“next to godliness”, and care is, well, caring. Neither could 
therefore be seen as “wrong”. Despite the similarities 
between female care work and sex work in terms of gen-
dered stereotypes, care work is considered both necessary 
and morally “good”. It is here, therefore, that we can find a 
crucial difference in approach in radical feminism towards 
the two forms of “work” (not that it recognises sex work as 
work). If sex workers were judged to be conducting valuable 
and respectable work, as is the case with care work, it is dif-
ficult to imagine how radical feminists would be pursuing 
an approach of “end demand” and abolition. While radical 
feminism attempts to escape the old-fashioned notion that 
individual sex workers are themselves immoral, it never-
theless aligns itself with a view that what sex work has to 
offer is morally undesirable. Indeed, Laite (2020) notes the 
similarities between “end demand” and the “conservative 
campaigns for moral reform” of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
Comparing sex work with caring and cleaning reveals that 
implicit to the “end demand” approach is a long-standing set 
of moral beliefs. If, as a society, we were entirely comfort-
able with sex—and happy for people to choose to monetise 
their bodies as well as their brains—it is difficult to imagine 
why a policy approach which involves criminalising those 
who pay for sex, strangling the client-base of those who sell 
sex (of whatever gender), would be appealing. Moreover, if 
we were simply concerned about people being forced into 
sex work through poverty, then we would be emphasising 
worker rights and encouraging workers to collectivise, as 
well as tackling the inflexibility of the welfare state, lack 
of access to adult education and employment opportuni-
ties, rather than strangling demand for sex. And, if we were 
concerned with trafficking, which occurs both within and 
beyond the sex trade, including in the form of domestic slav-
ery, we would be examining our border policies. The fact 
that the policy approach favoured by radical feminists is to 
strangle demand is indicative of a view that women should 
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not be selling sex, and that sex should not be open for pur-
chase. Society would, apparently, be better off without the 
exchange of sex for money, and gender equality would be 
better served without—rather than with—sex workers. As 
the name of the San Francisco sex worker group COYOTE 
suggested to radical feminists and other sex work abolition-
ists as far back as the 1970s: it’s time to Cast Off Your Old 
Tired Ethics (Weiss, 2018, p. 302).
In 1913, Teresa Billington-Greig argued that penalties 
imposed even at the buyer as opposed to seller end were 
enacted for reasons of a warm moral glow, rather than in 
view of the evidence:
“those responsible for it may have obtained ease of 
mind, the selfish satisfaction of having accomplished 
something. But that is merely the measure of their 
folly…The Fathers of the old church made a mess of the 
world by teaching the Adam story and classing women 
as unclean; the Mothers of the new Church are threaten-
ing the future by the whitewashing of women and the 
doctrine of the uncleanliness of men” (Billington-Greig, 
1913, p. 446).
Radical feminists today may—like the Victorian 
moralists—feel a warm moral glow by throwing their 
weight behind the “abolition” of sex work, but warm 
moral glows do not compensate for the harm imposed 
on real people. As we will see in what follows, not only 
does feminist resistance to decriminalisation increases 
as opposed to reduce the harm that sex workers face, it 
also contributes to the harm which the “cult of female 
modesty” inflicts on women beyond sex work.
Sex Work Abolitionism: the “Cult of Female 
Modesty” in Disguise
For centuries, women’s bodies have been seen as sinful, and 
a woman’s respect, worth and value rested delicately on her 
bodily modesty: on where a woman found herself on the 
continuum between “good girl” and “whore”. Bodily mod-
esty was deemed necessary both for individual women to 
protect themselves from harm—by keeping their “tempta-
tions” under wraps—and for wider social order. Immodest 
women were thought to provoke sin, leading to a breakdown 
of society. As such, they were singled out, punished and 
stigmatised. Patriarchy benefited: it was able to take what 
the “whores” had to offer while at the same time limiting 
their power, and it gave men a useful bargaining chip that 
could be used against all women, as we see in “Susanna and 
the Elders”. As Karras (1996, p. 108) notes, for a long time, 
“[t]he arena of sexuality was the only one in which women 
could compete with men in importance…and it was the one 
in which men most feared they would not be able to control 
them”. Associating women’s bodies with sin and immoral-
ity was one way to take back control, while characterising 
women as temptresses allowed men to behave in whatever 
way they liked, guilt-free. Men could abuse and mistreat 
women while taking the “moral high ground”, spinning the 
punishment as deserved and in the best interest of wider 
society. Women’s bodies were fair game.
When it comes to women themselves, it is difficult to see 
how they could ever “win” from this “cult of female mod-
esty”. As MacKinnon (1989, p. 110) herself notes, “Virtuous 
girls, virginal, are “attractive,” up on those pedestals from 
which they must be brought down; unvirtuous girls, whores, 
are “provocative”, so deserve whatever they get”. The only 
way for women to earn popular respect was to abide by the 
modesty norms, which meant marking themselves out from 
other women; engaging in slut-shaming. This type of world is 
not one that has ever proved to be commensurate with gender 
equality. Indeed, where such modesty norms are most clearly 
practiced in the world today, one finds unequal opportuni-
ties and unequal rights for women. But, the “cult of female 
modesty” lives on in the Western World today, albeit holding 
women to a different “modesty” standard. Wendy Shalit’s 
best-selling American book calls for “A Return to Modesty” 
(2014) and “Purity Culture” is popular within the growing 
Evangelical movement, something which has been linked to 
rape culture and abuse within these communities (Allison, 
2021; Klement & Sagarin, 2017; Moon & Reger, 2014). 
Gabby Aossey writes that “[h]ip Feminist campaigns like 
Free the Nipple only encourage a gullible behavior of disre-
spect for our own bodies, leading to everyone else around us 
disrespecting our bodies as well…Muslim woman get respect 
and are looked at beyond aesthetics; they are actually taken 
seriously in their communities” (Aossey, 2017). But this 
renewed emphasis on female modesty is not only a feature 
of religious groups, it also manifests itself in feminist circles: 
in the lack of respect radical feminism offers to “immodest 
women”, and most notably sex workers. As we will further 
see in what follows, this is visible, firstly, in the language 
employed within the abolitionist lobby, and, secondly, in the 
dismissal of sex workers’ voices.
According to the artist Claire Bentley-Smith, described 
as “working closely” with the Leeds-based UK organisation 
“Save Our Eyes”, an organisation which successfully chal-
lenged the street sex work managed zone, sex workers are 
“broken dolls” (Hyde, 2018). Bentley-Smith has therefore 
built sculptures made from rubbish, consisting of broken 
doll heads, monopoly money, drug refuse, or dirty bits of 
discarded underwear (Hyde, 2018). As Lister and Campbell 
(2018) responded: “They are not broken doll heads, monopoly 
money, drug refuse, or dirty bits of discarded underwear – the 
women working on the street in Leeds are human beings”. As 
Gemma Ahearne has tweeted: “When I was a dancer aged 
18–23, people spoke to me like rubbish. They spoke about 
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dancers as…polluting. I vowed I would never let another 
dancer feel like that. The abolitionists are pushing ‘purity 
culture’”. Just as Claire Bentley-Smith compares sex work-
ers with “broken dolls” and rubbish, Natasha Walter refers to 
women more generally who could be thought of as immodest 
as “living dolls” (Walter, 2011). Carole Pateman claims that 
“[p]rostitution remains morally undesirable” (Pateman, 1983, 
p. 56); even though she characterises sex workers as victims as 
opposed to immoral beings, the fact that she cannot find any 
value in or respect for the work sex workers perform (in fact, 
radical feminism will not even recognise sex work as work), 
speaks volumes. Without realising it, one victim of sexual 
abuse in the workplace sums up the general disrespect which 
sex workers are afforded by society: “I felt like a prostitute, 
an utter disappointment to myself, my parents, my friends” 
(Berg, 2020, p. 272). As Zatz suggests, perhaps it is “not sex 
work per se” that is the problem but instead “the particular 
cultural and legal production of a marginalised, degraded 
prostitution that ensures its oppressive characteristics while 
acting to limit the subversive potential that might attend a 
decriminalised, culturally legitimised form of sex work” 
(Zatz, 1997, p. 291). Hence the call made by sex workers in 
the World Charter for Prostitutes’ Rights “to change social 
attitudes which stigmatize and discriminate against prosti-
tutes and ex-prostitutes of any race, gender or nationality” 
(see Weiss, 2018, p. 304).
Throughout radical feminist and abolitionist discussion 
of sex work one finds use of the phrase “buying women”. 
For example, the 2008 report published by the Women’s 
Support Project was titled “A Research Report Based on 
Interviews with 110 Men Who Bought Women in Prostitu-
tion” (Macleod et al., 2008; emphasis added). Julie Bindel 
(2020) writes of “punters, many of whom travel from outside 
of the city, are able to buy a woman with the same ease with 
which they might pick up a burger”. Carole Pateman writes 
that “when a prostitute contracts out the use of her body she 
is…selling herself in a very real way” (Pateman, 1988, p. 
207). Alison Jaggar writes that “since, unlike a man, she [a 
woman] is defined largely in sexual terms, when she sells her 
sexuality she sells herself” (Jaggar, 1991, p. 274).
But, as Zatz responds, when a female sex worker sells sex to 
a male client: “Possibly she is selling his image of her sexual-
ity—but this image is not herself…There is no more reason to 
think that sex workers cannot separate their work from their sex 
life than there is to think that therapists cannot separate their 
work from their emotional life” (Zatz, 1997, p. 298). And, as 
A Vindication of the Rights of Whores makes clear, “feminists 
have to realise that all work involves selling some part of your 
body. You might sell your brain, you might sell your back, you 
might sell your fingers for typewriting. Whatever it is that you do 
you are selling one part of your body. I choose to sell my body 
the way I want to and I choose to sell my vagina” (Pheterson, 
1989, p. 146). While radical feminists suggest that men see 
women as “sex objects”, their own use of language suggests 
something similar when it comes to sex workers. The notion that 
buying sex is equivalent to buying a woman, seems to suggest 
that radical feminists themselves—somewhat ironically—see 
the women involved as just sex objects. Of course, by reduc-
ing a sex worker’s identity down to one single identifying fea-
ture—sex—radical feminism is, conveniently, able to escape the 
uncomfortable comparison with care work altogether (Scoular, 
2004, p. 345).
In addition to its use of language, a further way in which 
radical feminisms’ disrespect for sex workers manifests itself 
is in its dismissal of sex workers’ own voices. Let us first of 
all take a look at a couple of these voices.
In the words of the sex work activist Laura Lee (2014):
“I don’t ask you to like what I do ... what I do ask for is 
to be allowed to do my job in safety and to be treated 
with dignity and respect…there is no greater feeling 
than meeting a disabled person who has never been 
with a woman and affording them their first orgasm. To 
bring such happiness and fulfilment into someone’s life 
is something I treasure. Sex work is work, just like any 
other. And those of us in the industry deserve support 
and respect—not to be reviled and stigmatized”
And, as Kirio Birks (2018), a defender of Grid Girls, 
notes:
“[S]urely a woman has a right to be the object of some-
body else’s desire if she wants and surely it doesn’t 
matter if she is being paid for it?…Rather than send-
ing Grid Girls off into the wilds of unemployment, 
or providing one less place for would-be models, a 
far better solution would have been to make sure that 
they’re unionised, properly paid, and protected. If they 
are, then they have empowered other women to take 
up work they might otherwise have avoided, in a safer 
way.”
Whether or not you yourself can imagine wanting to be 
a sex worker, these voices should be allowed to speak for 
themselves. Once, I could not imagine how any woman 
would want to pose or protest naked; now I do it myself. 
How can I, therefore, assume to know the mind of every 
other woman? How can I assume to know what is better for 
another woman than she herself does? How can I discount 
the voices of individual sex workers who demand rights and 
recognition, not “end demand”?
Here, however, radical feminists think they do have just 
cause to override sex workers’ voices. Their first defence is 
that of “socialisation”, or what a Marxist would call “false 
consciousness”. From Simone de Beauvoir (1949) to Natasha 
Walter (2011), feminist theorists have long argued that women 
are socially conditioned to behave in a way that benefits the 
patriarchy. For some abolitionists, this carries the implication 
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that sex workers who speak out against the “end demand” 
approach can be conveniently ignored; they are presumed to 
be speaking on behalf of “pimps and punters” rather than for 
themselves. Hence, while prominent Labour Members of the 
UK Parliament, such as Sarah Champion and Jess Philipps, 
more normally emphasise the importance of listening to work-
ers, they do not do so when it comes to sex workers, who are 
assumed to be victims rather than “workers”.
But, isn’t it intellectually elitist for radical feminists to 
assume that they know better than sex workers themselves? 
As Zatz notes, “attributions of false consciousness carry tre-
mendous drawbacks. For starters, they are radically undemo-
cratic, setting up a privileged group (usually intellectuals) 
to interpret the experience of others for them” (Zatz, 1997, 
p. 296). Isn’t the whole point of feminism to listen to the 
voices of women, particularly those seen as at the margins 
of society? As one active member of #Labour4Decrim (a 
group tied to the UK Labour Party, supporting sex workers 
and allies), tweeted in December 2020, “I’m sick of women 
labour members and trade unionists slapping themselves 
on the back and saying that women need to be heard and 
then ignoring and talking over sex workers who are try-
ing to do that”. Ensuring that all women have voices and 
choices should be the feminist goal, and that goal can be 
achieved while welcoming sex workers, recognising their 
voice and ensuring they have the same rights as any other 
worker. The policy package which sex workers themselves 
favour—a three-pronged approach of decriminalisation, pov-
erty-reduction and tackling borders—is one that can both 
reduce the number of non-consensual sex workers and also 
avoid hurting consensual sex workers. Once one entertains 
the possibility that sex work involves a whole range of expe-
riences, and that these experiences are shaped by the law, 
by poverty and by stigma, it is a policy approach that, on a 
theoretical as well as practical level, trumps the blunter “end 
demand” approach.
Not only does radical feminism reduce sex workers’ 
voices and demands down to the “pimp lobby”, it, albeit 
subtly, prioritises male experiences ahead of female ones. 
Bindel (2017a, b) argues that many of the organisations sup-
porting or campaigning for decriminalisation are backed by 
the “pimp lobby”, and so we can effectively ignore them. 
Despite the evidence Amnesty International received from 
numerous sex workers, the fact that a man who owns an 
escort business spoke in favour of decriminalisation at one 
of their annual general meetings is, according to Bindel, 
reason to ignore Amnesty’s extensive work showing that 
decriminalisation is better for sex workers. She also noted 
that: “[a] legal challenge to the law in Northern Ireland is 
being led by Laura Lee, a “sex workers’ rights” campaigner 
– whose backers include the pimp Peter McCormick. I hope 
Lee loses” (Bindel, 2017a, b). Lee was a sex worker and 
sex work activist who wanted to reverse Northern Ireland’s 
implementation of “end demand” because it made her feel 
less safe. But, because McCormick would benefit, this is 
thought to be enough to override Lee’s own safety.
In regard to the impact of decriminalisation in New 
Zealand, Bindel (2017a, b) writes that: “Views differ as to 
whether decriminalisation has made the situation better or 
worse. One report, published five years after decriminalisa-
tion, claimed it had little impact on the number of people 
working in the sex trade but had offered some safeguards to 
children and others. But the personal testimony of women 
who have been prostituted provides evidence that brothel 
owners and punters have benefited more than the women 
have”. She nevertheless does not support New Zealand’s 
decriminalisation. Despite the fact that it has resulted in 
greater “safeguards”, because brothel owners and punters 
have benefitted, it would have been better, apparently, if it 
hadn’t happened.
So, should we more generally enact policy in a way 
that ensures that what are seen as male “aggressors” don’t 
benefit, even if it comes at a cost to women? Male rapists 
might benefit from the fact that we live in a country where 
women are free to leave their homes unaccompanied, unlike 
in communities which practice purdah. Does that mean that 
women’s freedom to roam should come second? That’s 
what Bindel’s approach to sex work would seem to sug-
gest, though her well known objection to police advice for 
women to “stay indoors” when the Yorkshire Ripper was on 
the loose reveals a degree of inconsistency. Surely, the inter-
ests of men—even criminal men or men we might consider 
“immoral”—should not override the voices and interests of 
women? If sex workers prefer decriminalisation, that should 
speak for itself.
In numerous ways, and across the world, the daily life of 
women is dictated by the way heterosexual men are assumed 
to “see”; by the “male gaze”. It is the male way of viewing 
and experiencing the world that overrides what a woman 
herself would like to do and how she herself witnesses the 
world. If she wants to cool down, whether by removing her 
headscarf or her bikini top, that comes second to concerns 
about how a man might view her uncovered body. If she 
wants to show off her personality, rejecting conformity, that 
is, once again, overridden by how a man might interpret her 
state of dress. If she wants to protest naked, that must come 
second to how men might “benefit” from the sight of her 
body. As Emily Channell writes, “[m]ainstream women’s 
organizations and many academic feminists see Femen’s 
topless actions as simply giving men more of what they 
want—easily accessible women’s bodies” (Channell, 2014, 
p. 613). On that basis, the tactics of not only Femen but also 
Pussy Riot, #freethenipple and my own activism are deemed 
“unfeminist” (Channell, 2014; Rivers, 2017; Matich et al., 
2019). Hence why Tim Young of the Fox TV channel can 
tweet in response to my protests that “[t]here’s nothing more 
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anti-feminist than having to strip naked desperate for a man’s 
attention”. The priority given to the male gaze means that 
a woman is judged on something other than her own terms, 
and is expected to dress and behave in a way that is dictated 
by how men might think and feel; if men might benefit from 
a particular action, then a woman should not do it—even if 
she wants to do it. Limiting men’s “benefit” is more impor-
tant than a woman acting in her own self interest.
Living our lives in a way that is limited by the male gaze 
as a means to escape the male gaze would seem to be a pyr-
rhic victory. The solution to women being viewed as “sex 
objects” is to be found in changing the way we as a society 
judge women, rather than in changing (and restricting) wom-
en’s behaviour. When I employ someone to move my heavy 
academic books, it is typically a man who arrives at my 
door, but that does not mean that I objectify men as existing 
to fulfil my muscle-based needs, seeing them a “cart horses”. 
Where men choose to see women as sexual objects, it is 
they—and not women themselves—who are to blame. Just 
because some women do not cover their bodies is no excuse 
for people to think that women are “just bodies”, and just 
because some women sell sex is no excuse for men thinking 
that women are simply “sexual objects” available for the tak-
ing. After all, I’m perfectly able to respect a man whatever 
he is or isn’t wearing; it would, to my mind, be superficial 
to judge another person based on their state of dress. And I, 
for one, am also perfectly capable of respecting people who 
sell sex. Similarly, just because a woman makes you a cof-
fee in a cafe, or makes your hotel bed, does not mean that 
you should assume that all women exist to serve your basic 
needs. If men feel sexually entitled to women’s bodies, and if 
women’s respect and worth hangs on something as flimsy as 
a piece of cloth, we really do have a problem, but that prob-
lem is not uncovered women or sex workers: should women 
really have to cover up—or only have sex for free—in order 
to earn respect? The problem is in the collective beliefs of 
a society that judges women based on their bodily modesty, 
with those deemed “whores” expected to shoulder the blame 
for what happens in the heads of (some) men. As Priscilla 
Alexander has elsewhere pointed out, abolitionist feminists 
internalise the notion that the “whore” is “the cause of wom-
en’s pain”, and women will never be free until they are no 
longer afraid of this very word (Alexander, 1997, p. 83). 
What we find in radical feminism is the goal of completely 
abolishing sex work, the ultimate form of “whore-phobia”.
Perhaps, however, this argument is best made by turning 
to sex workers’ own voices. Let’s begin with a letter which 
a sex worker sent to the American group Women Against 
Pornography, now housed in the Schlesinger Library 
archive at the Radcliffe Institute of Harvard University:
“I recently heard one of your members say that porn 
films caused rape. I work in sex films. I don’t think 
that women who appear sexy, either in film or in 
person are to blame for rape. The blame lies with 
the rapist—so let’s not make excuses for his crime…
To say that looking at a sexy picture makes a nor-
mal, healthy man go out and rape is crazy. Most of 
the men I meet would not force themselves on me, 
and the ones who would, would do so even if they 
never saw an X rated film” (Exhibited at Museum of 
City of New York in 2018, courtesy of Schlesinger 
Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University).
The same sex worker notes that she and her colleagues 
face violence of a sort ignored by the feminist group: vio-
lence from the authorities, which takes the form of “police 
violence every night". She adds that “you work hand in 
hand” with these authorities under the same banner of 
“cleaning up” the streets. The Yorkshire Ripper, who 
murdered numerous sex workers in the north of England 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, also claimed to be “clean-
ing up the streets” (Summers, 2008). As Roberts (1992) 
and Lowman (2000) have shown, “whore stigma” and the 
“discourse of disposal” fuels the violent treatment and 
murder of sex workers. Kinnell (2008) documents the 
way in which sex workers are portrayed as “social pol-
lutants” and equated with rubbish. As Cunningham and 
Sanders (2017) conclude: “Only with a combination of 
anti-stigma work alongside meaningful legal and policy 
change that prioritizes sex worker safety can there be any 
hope of addressing the tragedy of sex worker homicide”. 
As Laverte (2017) writes:
“There is a lack of understanding that first and fore-
most, it is social prejudices about prostitution that 
render it difficult for us to protect ourselves. That 
is because they lower the threshold to use violence 
against us – among clients, among the police, among 
everyone”
This same stigma affects the ability of law enforcement 
to catch those who are engaging in exploitation within the 
sex sector. The fear of being “outed” is a common fear, 
as a result of which many cases of abuse and exploitation 
go unreported (Payne, 2014). As Belinda Brooks-Gordon 
(2016) writes:
“[E]xploiters can only be held to account with an 
increased chance of being caught. Currently, the likeli-
hood of being caught is low because sex workers are so 
stigmatized they are reluctant to report offences. Decrim-
inalization is an effective way to ensure that exploiters 
are more likely to be held to account (Barnet, 2004), as 
is making violence against sex workers a hate crime.”
As Julia Laite notes of the “end demand” approach, it 
is “an ideal way to appear to crack down on prostitution 
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without appearing to crack down on the women involved”. In 
reality, “[t]he legal stigma of selling sex might be removed 
by a law that criminalizes clients and only clients, but the 
social stigma of engaging in the sex industry—even if it 
is claimed to be a choice made by an adult woman—still 
remains” and, as such, “end demand” still “maintains the 
age-old position that prostitution is inherently morally 
wrong” (Laite in McCarthy et al., 2015).
The “cult of female modesty” does not serve women well, 
whether sex workers or not. Not only does violence towards 
sex workers go unreported because of stigma and associated 
reputational fears, so too does abuse of nonsex workers in 
communities where the modesty cult is particularly strong. 
Zakaria et al. (2020) note that “[s]exual violence often goes 
unreported in Pakistan, as victims risk being cast out by 
their parents, are forced to marry their rapists or are killed 
over the perceived injury to their families’ honor”. In recent 
years, stories of rape and murder of women in India and 
Pakistan have proliferated. On 1 December 2019 a female 
student in Pakistan was forcibly taken from her car by a 
group of five men. Here were just some of the responses 
(Chaturvedi & Niaz, 2019):
“Jab mithayi ko khula chorro ge to makhyan zaroor 
ayen gi” (If you leave the sweet box open, it will inevi-
tably attract flies).
“Ye to hona hi tha, kapre to dekho” (This was inevita-
ble, look at what she is wearing).
“Well done kidnappers… Jo log apni bachio ko be 
lagaam chor dete hain. They deserve this” (Those who 
leave their daughters unconstrained deserve this).
This suggests that the problem is not “immodest” women 
but those who deem women to be unworthy based on what 
they judge to be “immodest” behaviour; those who, as a 
result, see women as ripe for attack and punishment. Closer 
to home, and as Allison (2021) shows in her book #Church-
Too, the “purity culture” that exists within Evangelical 
Christianity “upholds abuse” within American communities.
So, in sum, are sex workers, pornography and scantily 
clad women (including myself) really what causes harm to 
womankind? Is abolishing pornography and “prostitution” 
really the best approach for tackling gender inequality? If 
“immodest" women and sexualised images of women were 
central to gender inequality, why are countries like Iran 
and Pakistan not at the top of the gender equality rankings? 
Perhaps it is because what causes most damage to wom-
ankind is not women who wander around scantily clad or 
who sell sex, but, instead, what happens in people’s minds: 
the social belief that a woman’s value rests on her physi-
cal modesty. It is this belief that not only causes harm to 
sex workers—causing clients to mistreat them and limiting 
their options to speak out for fear of their reputation—but 
that leads to men’s guilt-free mistreatment of women who 
they more generally judge to be “trashy”. In response to one 
of my naked protests, Deborah Kurbjuweit, who graduated 
from Berkeley, tweeted that I was fat and needed to lose 
weight, and then followed up with: “The body is sacred until 
you decide to give it over to gawking, opinionated onlook-
ers. Then you get what you deserve”. This attitude—one in 
which immodest women are fair game who “get what they 
deserve” is the ultimate problem, and it is a problem rooted 
in minds, not in immodesty. It is this same modesty cult that 
results in so many of the policies and practices that hurt 
women across the world. Those policies include control-
ling women’s travel, where they work, and their clothing, 
all to supposedly “protect” them from mistreatment. It also 
includes social practices that involve cutting off women’s 
genitals, compulsory virginity testing and “honour killings”. 
Radical feminism should be challenging the modesty cult, 
not contributing to it with its insistence that sex workers are 
not welcome in the feminist utopia.
On one level, feminism of course rejects the idea that a 
woman’s worth hangs on her body. But, at the same time, it 
nevertheless judges women based on what they do with that 
body, seeing gender inequality as the result of using that body 
in “immodest” ways. Of course, so as not to appear as if one is 
blaming women themselves for the resultant gender inequal-
ity, immodest women have to be cast as unwilling victims. It 
is simply inconceivable that any woman would choose to be 
a sex worker if you believe that a woman’s value rests on her 
bodily modesty; but, once we escape from the “cult of female 
modesty”, sex workers voices start to make sense, and the idea 
of “abolishing” them is revealed for what it is. That is, a mor-
ally-driven and intellectually elitist project in which a group of 
“clever” women are ganging up to deny women on the margins 
of society the rights and freedoms that they themselves benefit 
from. It is a battle in which women who monetise their brains 
are denying others the freedom to monetise their bodies.
For centuries, men have regulated and restricted what 
women can do with their bodies and with their brains. Over 
the last century, women have taken great strides in terms of 
their ability to use their brains as they wish. However, the 
same cannot be said of their bodies. Show too much of that 
body, and you’ll be accused—as I so often am accused—of 
objectifying and sexualising yourself, of “setting feminism 
back a hundred years” and of “embarrassing” womankind. 
And, whilst freely making money from your brain is to be 
celebrated, making money from your body is, apparently, 
not. Ultimately, isn’t it inconsistent to allow women to both 
uncover and make money from their brains but not to uncover 
or make money from their bodies? A good chunk of mod-
ern day—radical—feminism looks increasingly hypocritical, 
intellectually elitist and unfair. It has far too many overlaps 
with historic moralistic-driven campaigns to abolish sex work, 
and with those who persist in the modern day with blaming 
society’s problems on the immodest behaviour of women.
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Conclusion
Since the story of Eve tempting Adam, women’s bodies have 
been associated with sin: the nude was rude and—through 
its ability to engender lust—the female form was seen as par-
ticularly problematic, even as the root of evil. A woman who 
revealed more of her body than was customary was seen as 
devaluing her worth and so lost her community’s respect. So 
too did a woman, unlike a man, who engaged in “too much” 
sexual activity. In Britain, this arguably reached its peak in 
the Victorian era. Even suffragettes adopted the supposed 
virtue of “purity” as part of their weaponry, embedding it in 
the white stripe that formed part of their tricolour branding. 
Jumping forward a century or more, many feminists seem to 
be returning to the same ideals, taking the view that women 
who reveal too much of their body or present themselves in 
a sexual way are “objectifying themselves” to the benefit of 
men. We tell our daughters that they must abide by certain 
modesty norms if they are to be respected in the same way 
as a man: as a brain and a person and not as “a body”. We 
instruct them not to behave “like whores”.
Rather than fighting the menace that is the “cult of female 
modesty”, there is an illiberal element within modern day 
feminism that has effectively co-opted it and employs its 
flawed reasoning to not only justify denying sex workers their 
bodily autonomy but to implicitly blame sex workers for the 
gender inequality which all women face. While women’s bod-
ies have always been a “battleground”, what is ironic is that 
feminists themselves can be increasingly found on the front 
lines of attack. While the mantra “my body my choice” is 
applied to some things, its application is far from consistent. 
While feminists can regularly be found defending women’s 
ability to control their fertility, they can also be found attack-
ing women’s freedom to dress as they wish, along with the 
rights of those who not only reveal but monetise their bodies. 
Implicit is a view that while it is perfectly acceptable—even 
to be encouraged—for a woman to “show off” and monetise 
her brain, it is not acceptable to do the same with her body. If 
a woman does, it can only be—we are told—because she is 
either desperate or is not in her right mind, and she must be 
forced out of this mindset so as to prevent indignity and harm 
to other women. If only women covered up and if only they 
were selling their brains not their bodies, gender inequalities 
could, apparently, be tackled.
If women’s respect and worth does hang on something as 
flimsy as a piece of cloth, and whether they accept money in 
return for sex, then we really do have a problem. That prob-
lem, however, is not with uncovered women or sex workers. 
Acting as if it is—enacting policies that control the bodily 
freedoms of these women—not only fails to help, it will make 
the problem worse, giving credence to the modesty cult. If any 
women do deserve blame for gender inequality it is not sex 
workers or scantily clad women but, instead, those who propa-
gate the view that a woman’s worth, respect and value hangs 
on her body; those who believe that women who uncover are 
“trashy” and that sex workers are “whores”. Ironically, these 
same women will tell you that they are fighting against the 
view that a woman’s worth hangs on her body, while at the 
same time pouring shame and scorn in a way that causes the 
guilt-free mistreatment of sex workers and numerous others.
Only if feminism faces up to—and challenges—its 
modesty-loving tendencies can we build a world in which 
all women, sex workers and others, are treated with greater 
respect. The radical feminist utopia is one in which sex 
workers have been banished. My utopia is instead one 
in which women are free to monetise their brain or their 
body (or both), with those who monetise their body being 
treated no differently to those who monetise their brain, 
with equal respect and equal rights. The harm which sex 
workers face results not only from bad sex laws that leave 
them operating in the shadows, but from a deep-rooted 
social belief that immodest women are “trashy” and so 
undeserving of respect. Sadly, it is this very attitude that 
radical feminists seem to be complicit in, an attitude which 
is itself at the root not only of violence towards sex work-
ers but towards women more generally. Confronting the 
“cult of female modesty” can have a transformative effect 
in reducing the harm experienced by women in and beyond 
sex work.
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